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Abstract
Comparing the Portuguese Constitution, which has the longest unamendable clause
in the world, with the silence of the Spanish Constitution regarding the language of
eternity is indeed a fascinating exercise. Each state’s quantum of constitutional
change seems to be quite different. One can wonder how two neighbouring states
that share a heavy history of right-wing dictatorships and transitioned to democ‐
racy forty years ago opted for such dissimilar constitutional designs. However,
appearances are often misleading, and an effort should be done to unveil this curi‐
ous mismatch.
Both legal orders suffer from what I call constitutional narcissism, which man‐
ifests itself through the urge to perpetuate the foundational constitutional
moment. Unamendable clauses (Portugal) and quasi-unamendable clauses (Spain)
recast one of constitutional theory’s inner paradoxes: Can the constituent power of
the people be petrified in one historical constituent decision and constrain future
democratic transitions? And what if a volatile contemporary majority seeks to
undermine the democratic process and run against the constitutional DNA achieve‐
ments of the last centuries?
Even if the original version of the Portuguese Constitution prohibited several
provisions from ever being amended, some of these provisions were indeed modified
or removed in the 1989 constitutional amendment process. This occurred without
major disagreement from the political organs, scholars, or the judiciary. Therefore,
the vexata quaestio remains unanswered: Given their obsolescence or hindrance
towards good governance, should entrenchment clauses be eliminated de jure
(through a channelled constitutional amendment process, such as the double
amendment procedure) or de facto (through a revolutionary process materialized
outside of the constitutional framework)?
Keywords: unamendable/ eternity clauses, de jure and de facto constitutional
change, constitutional narcissism, foundational design, helicopter founding
fathers, constitutional alma mater.
* Assistant Professor and Department Chair of Constitutional Law at the Porto Faculty of Law,
Universidade Católica Portuguesa. Email: cbotelho@porto.ucp.pt. I thank Paul Kahn, Nuno
Garoupa, Richard Albert, Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro, Yaniv Roznai, Ana Teresa Ribeiro, and Luís
Heleno Terrinha for their very helpful comments.





This is a particular auspicious time to undertake a project on hyper-rigidity and
unamendability. Comparative constitutional law studies on constitutional
amendment are fortunately thriving. In an impressive empirical research, Yaniv
Roznai has collected information about unamendable clauses around the world.1
He has concluded that, in the aftermath of World War II, “out of the 742 consti‐
tutions that were examined, 212 constitutions (28 per cent) include or included
unamendable provisions”.2 The author identified a growth not only in the
unamendable clauses’ quantity but also on their quality (complexity and length).3
This article aims to cast theoretical light on the fragile balance between
change and permanence by situating hyper-rigid constitutional amendment pro‐
cedures at the crossroads of democracy and constitutionalism. Part B gathers sev‐
eral levels of increased constitutional change (constitutional interpretation, con‐
stitutional mutation, constitutional amendment, and constitution-making).
Part C focuses on constitutional permanence, addressing constitutional
rigidity and the danger of semantic constitutions. This article examines the con‐
ceptual coherence and normative desirability of entrenchment clauses, highlight‐
ing the Portuguese Constitution, which has a remarkable, substantial limitations
list. Although the Spanish Constitution does not incorporate an entrenchment
clause, its constitutional amendment procedure is highly complex and rigid.
If democracy is a pro tempore phenomenon, which envisions the possibility of
change, constitutionalism aims at permanence and stability. Constitutions are
conceived to be long-lasting texts. In order to do so, constitutions must be adapt‐
able to a mutable society, to changeable political views, idiosyncrasies, and so on.
If the gap between what is written in the constitution and the constitutional real‐
ity is too significant, then a total amendment, or even the adoption of a new con‐
stitution, could be necessary.
When unamendable clauses become an ethereal, intangible core, they
obstruct societal evolution and ironically betray their original intent of preserving
the constitutional order. In so doing, entrenchment clauses become insurmounta‐
ble obstacles to constitutional chance, and the only way to surpass them is to
breach the current constitutional order and to approve a new constitution. In this
scenario, from a desirable, continuous constitutional evolution, there is an abrupt
constitutional revolution. In practice, this sudden change can occur through a rev‐
olution or even a bloodless legal coup d’État.
Constitutional stagnation would mean an illegitimate differentiation
between the “the people”: the constituent power would represent the illuminated
people (the sovereign people at the time of the constitutional foundation) and the
constitutional amendment power would in turn embody the subjugated people
1 Y. Roznai, ‘Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty’, in R. Albert, X.
Contiades & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment, Port‐
land, Hart Publishing, 2017a, pp. 23-49, at p. 21.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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(the current people).4 It seems undeniable that the constitutional text should
refrain from becoming “primary monologues rather than dialogues” between the
founding fathers and the future generations.5
Part D suggests an innovative perspective on the Portuguese and Spanish
hyper-rigid constitutional amendment procedures. Narcissistic traits in the
exceedingly strict amending formulas of both constitutions will be acknowledged,
even though this dysfunctionality has significant differences vis-à-vis each consti‐
tutional experience. The narcissism of the Portuguese foundational moment trig‐
gered a substantial divorce from the past and an ideological compromise: the
transition to a classless society. I will argue that the Portuguese Constitution of
1976, being one of the last postmodern, revolutionary constitutions, is distinctly
a defensive text, with singularities that set it apart from the rest of the European
constitutions.
On the contrary, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 is in tune with the main
European constitutional models. The Spanish constitutional hyper-rigidity
reveals a functional approach that is the result of a coping mechanism for consti‐
tutional anxiety and fear of historical comebacks. As the lessons from the 1931
Constitution and the Civil War taught, and as the current crisis in Catalonia
reflects, one of the most delicate problems of the Spanish constitutionalism is the
regional structure of Spain.
B Constitutional Change
The constitutional foundational moment is a constitution-making process, culmi‐
nating either in a single constitutional text (codified constitution) or in several
legislative acts with constitutional worth (uncodified constitution). However, the
foundational stone is just a part (although the most magnificent one) of a contin‐
uous process.
For this reason, in terms of constitutional theory and political philosophy, we
must return to the normative basics and ask not only what a constitution is but
also what a constitution can and should be. We are prompted to revisit the core
elements of constitutionalism, such as democracy, popular sovereignty, and rule
of law.
Belonging to a generation that was born after the constituent foundational
moment, I strongly believe that a constitution has more to offer than predeter‐
mined legal, political, and societal choices. So, what should constitutions offer,
aside from their normativity and higher hierarchical status? Choices, adaptability,
guidance, safety, and trust.
4 Stating that each constitution represents the people’s consensus. See K. Stern, Das Staatsrecht der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Vol. III, München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1988, p. 122.
5 S. Ranchordás, ‘Constitutional Sunrise’, in R. Albert, X. Contiades, & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The Foun‐
dations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2017, pp. 177-197,
p. 177. Accordingly, M. Nogueira de Brito, A Constituição Constituinte: ensaio sobre o poder de revi‐
são da Constituição, Coimbra, 2000, p. 126.




I agree with Häberle’s perspective of the constitution being the “thought of
the possibilities” (Möglichkeitsdenken), which is consonant with the ideas of open‐
ness and mutability.6 The way a constitutional text is accepted by future genera‐
tions, easing or hindering constitutional change, tells us a lot about its legitimacy
and normative force.
In the article ‘Does history define the Constitution or does the Constitution
define history?’, I have argued for a reciprocal influence between the two.7 Quite
simply, no one doubts that historical events triggered constitutional revolutions
and constitutional rebuilding (such as the liberal revolutions influenced the
American and the French liberal constitutions). Yet, some constitutions tried to
influence the course of history, with more or less success. For example, the origi‐
nal version of the current Portuguese Constitution aimed at building a utopian,
classless society.8
The magic formula for a long-lasting and normative constitution is in the del‐
icate balance between structural legal variability and the constitution’s preten‐
sion of durability.9 Rosalind Dixon and David Landau label this combination as
“tiered constitutionalism”.10 As constitutions are not attuned with constitutional
fossilization, they should be compatible with constitutional pluralism and adher‐
ence to multiple (and sometimes even conflicting) principles.11 More importantly,
6 P. Häberle, Verfassung als öffentlicher Prozeβ – Materialen zu einer Verfassungstheorie der offenen
Gesellschaft, 2nd ed., Berlin, Duncker, & Humblot, 1996. With a similar approach, A. Anzon, ‘La
Corte costituzionale e il «diritto vivente»’, in Scritti su la Giustizia Costituzionale – In Onore di Vezio
Crisafulli, Padua, CEDAM, 1985, pp. 1-19, pp. 7-11; E.A. Young, ‘The Constitution outside the
Constitution’, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 117, 2007, pp. 408-473, at p. 411.
7 C.S. Botelho, ‘A História faz a Constituição ou a Constituição faz a História? – Reflexões sobre a
História Constitucional portuguesa’, Revista do Instituto de Direito Brasileiro, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2013,
pp. 229-247.
8 There are other examples of the post-Soviet Eastern European constitutions that are mainly
aspirational and have very little connection to reality. This devalues the constitution and the
very purpose of a codified text. See R. Albert, ‘Counterconstitutionalism’, Dalhousie Law Journal,
Vol. 31, 2008, pp. 27-29 and 35.
9 C.S. Botelho, Os Direitos Sociais em Tempos de Crise – Ou revisitar as normas programáticas, Coim‐
bra, Almedina, 2015, p. 429; D. Wyduckel, ‘Verfassung und Konstitutionalisierung – Zur Reich‐
weite des Verfassungsbegriffs im Konstitutionalisierungsprozess’, in H. Butzer, M. Kaltenborn, &
W.H.S.F. Meyer (Eds.), Organisation und Verfahren im sozialen Rechtsstaat – Festschrift für Friedrich
E. Schnapp zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin, Duncker, & Humblot, 2008, pp. 893-924, at p. 895; N. Luh‐
mann, Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts – Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, Frankfurt am
Main, Suhrkamp, 1999, pp. 130 and 145.
10 R. Dixon & D. Landau, ‘Tiered Constitutional Design’, George Washington Law Review, forthcom‐
ing. R. Albert, ‘Constitutional Handcuffs’, Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 42, 2010, pp. 663-715,
709-712 discusses the idea of tiers and suggests the use of an ‘entrenchment simulator’ that rec‐
ommends multiple levels of amendment difficulty.
11 G. Zagrebelsky, ‘Storie e Costituzione’, in G. Zagrebelsky, P.P. Portinaro, & J. Luther (Eds.), Il
Futuro della Costituzione, Turin, Einaudi, 1996, pp. 35-82, pp. 81-82; R. Scholz, ‘Konstitutionali‐
sierte Politik oder politisierte Konstitution?’, in Realitätsprägung durch Verfassungsrecht – Kollo‐
quium aus Anlass des 80. Geburtstages von Peter Lerche, Berlin, Duncker, & Humblot, Berlim, pp.
9-16, at p. 10.
348 European Journal of Law Reform 2019 (21) 3
doi: 10.5553/EJLR/138723702019021003009
Constitutional Narcissism on the Couch of Psychoanalysis
constitutions “should speak to all citizens, whatever their divergent paths to citi‐
zenship”.12
The heart of constitutional change lies in the democratic principle, bridging
the past and the present. Some constitutions are more or less rigid; some have
been amended several times or just a few. If we compare the German Constitu‐
tion (1949) with the Spanish Constitution (1978) or with the Portuguese Consti‐
tution (1976), there are significant differences. The German Constitution was
amended more than fifty times, whereas the Spanish Constitution was amended
only twice and the Portuguese Constitution seven times.13
So how does the constitution adapt itself to the passing of time? How can a
static constitutional text incorporate dynamic urges from external sources repre‐
senting the living constitution?
The following figure will contemplate, in a decreasing order, levels of consti‐
tutional change difficulty: constitution-making, constitutional amendment, con‐
stitutional mutation, and constitutional interpretation. All of these constitu‐
tional processes belong, with different intensity, to lato sensu constituent power. I
will begin with constitutional interpretation and follow the openness path until
constitutional amendment, which happens when constitutional elasticity cannot





Amendment processes are constitutional legitimacy enablers, as they allow people
to revisit their constitution.14 The formal process of revision might have several
degrees of rigidity. Yaniv Roznai’s innovative thesis creates a very interesting
metaphor of a “constitutional escalator” of procedural protections.15
This ‘escalator’ of rigidity can be foreseen in several requirements of constitu‐
tional reform: approval by multiple houses, supermajority rules, multiple rounds
of voting, popular participation either direct (referendum) or indirect (after the
12 R. Albert, ‘Constitutional Handcuffs’, Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 42, 2010, pp. 663-715, at p.
689.
13 This is the reason why some authors referred to a ‘euphoria’ of constitutional amendment in
Germany. See P. Häberle, ‘Zeit und Verfassungsstaat – kulturwissenchaftlich betrachtet’, JURA,
Vol. 1, 2000, pp. 1-10, pp. 2-3; R. Wahl, ‘Verfassungsgebung – Verfassunsänderung – Verfas‐
sungswandel I’, in R. Wahl (Ed.), Verfassungsänderung, Verfassungswandel, Verfassungsinterpreta‐
tion – Vorträge bei deustch-japanischen Symposien in Tokyo 2004 und Freiburg 2005, Berlin,
Duncker, & Humblot, 2010, pp. 29-48, pp. 37-38. See also G. Halmai, Perspectives on Global Con‐
stitutionalism – The Use of Foreign and International Law, Eleven International Publishing, 2014, p.
32.
14 X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou, ‘Amendment-metrics’, in R. Albert, X. Contiades, & A. Fotiadou
(Eds.), The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment, Portland, Hart Publishing,
2017, pp. 219-240, at p. 227.
15 Y. Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments – The Limits of Amendment Powers, Oxford,
OUP, 2017b, pp. 164-168.




dissolution of the current parliament, the new parliamentary composition should
ratify the amendment), time frame for amendments, amongst others.
Constitutional mutation also favours constitutional evolution, but through a
slower path and taking into consideration societal and cultural changes. Through‐
out a constitutional mutation, the constitutional interpreter confers a different
meaning to the constitutional text, without altering it.16 An example of a consti‐
tutional mutation is present in the ruling of the Portuguese Constitutional Court
(PCC) regarding same-sex marriage.17 The Portuguese Constitution protects mar‐
riage and family, but it does not literally state that marriage is a contract between
a man and a woman. Therefore, when the parliament altered the Portuguese Civil
Code’s definition of marriage, to allow same-sex marriage, the question of the
compatibility with the Portuguese Constitution arose.
The president of the Republic asked the PCC to conduct a prior review of the
constitutionality of the norms contained in a Decree of the Assembly of the
Republic, which was sent to him for enactment and which permitted civil mar‐
riage between persons of the same sex.18
The court reasoned that extending marriage to same-sex spouses did not
conflict with the recognition and protection of the family as a ‘fundamental
element of society’, inasmuch as the Constitution undid the bond between
the formation of a family and marriage, and offered its protection to the dis‐
tinct family models which exist in our social reality. What is more, attributing
the right to marry to persons of the same sex does not affect the freedom to
enter into wedlock enjoyed by persons of different sexes, nor does it change
neither the rights and duties which apply to those persons as a result of their
marriage, nor the representation or image which they or the community may
attribute to their matrimonial state.
The court, therefore, decided not to hold the Portuguese Civil Code norms uncon‐
stitutional.
Constitutional interpretation, whether or not it evolves to a concrete substan‐
tial constitutional mutation, is also a relevant tool of constitutional evolution.
Constitutional justice plays a relevant role, through the judicial interpretation of
the state’s constitution and of other substantive (even if not formal) European or
international constitutional norms. It is important not to forget the major role
16 A. Voβkulhe, ‘Gibt es und wozu nutzt eine Lehre vom Verfassungswandel?’, in R. Wahl (Ed.), Ver‐
fassungsänderung, Verfassungswandel, Verfassungsinterpretation – Vorträge bei deustch-japanischen
Symposien in Tokyo 2004 und Freiburg 2005, Berlin, Duncker, & Humblot, 2010, pp. 201-210;
Wyduckel, 2008, p. 894; Helmuth Schulze-Fieliytz, ‘Verfassung als Prozeβ von Verfassungsänder‐
ungen ohne Verfassungstextänderungen’, in R. Wahl (Ed.) Verfassungsänderung, Verfassungswan‐
del, Verfassungsinterpretation, cit., p. 219; Häberle, 2000, pp. 2-3.
17 Ruling no. 121/10, 08/04/2010.
18 In Ruling no. 359/2009, the PCC decided that the Portuguese Constitution does not oblige the
law to allow same-sex marriages, and that both prohibiting them altogether and providing for a
different regime would be legitimate.
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played by other constitutional interpreters, such as the parliaments, executive
bodies, and other political organs.19
Notwithstanding this, there are several particularities of the constitutional
interpretation when compared with the interpretation of ordinary norms: (i) con‐
stitutional design is often abstract, blurry, and open to interpretation;20 (ii) the
laconic trait of some constitutional norms; (iii) high substantial density of consti‐
tutional norms; and (iv) the rigidness of constitutional norms.21
C Constitutional Permanence
I Constitutional Rigidity
An endogenous feature of lawmaking is the synchronic reasoning that tends to
focus on a somehow limited time horizon: the near past, the present, and the
immediate future. This temporal trait is especially evident in constitutional law‐
making, and there can be identified both static and dynamic characteristics.22 If,
in a retrospective view, the constitution aims to maintain its historical heritage,
in a prospective look (actio in distans), it must allow enough openness to adapt
itself to the evolution of the constitutional reality.
Constitutional rigidity is paramount for the stability of the constitutional
text.23 Empirical studies show a dangerous link between extreme constitutional
flexibly and constitutional demise.24 Since constitutionalism is a “matter of pru‐
19 In Japan, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau interprets the constitution in a quasi-judicially binding
way.
20 For V.F. Comella, ‘Una defensa de la rigidez constitucional’, Doxa. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Dere‐
cho, Vol. 23, 2000, pp. 29-47, p. 34, constitutional abstraction is a vital trait in a constitutional
text, in order to maintain its democratic legitimacy. It is abstraction that allows the union of sev‐
eral generations under the same constitutional roof (p. 35). In a similar sense, see C.R. Sunstein,
A Constitution of Many Minds, Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 19-20.
21 C.S. Botelho, ‘O papel dos princípios na interpretação constitucional’, in M.L. Amaral & S.P. Bet‐
tencourt (Eds.), Estudos em Homenagem ao Conselheiro Presidente Rui Moura Ramos, Coimbra,
Almedina, I, 2016, pp. 59-86, pp. 75-82. See also M.A. Reyes, ‘La interpretación de la Constitución
y el carácter objetivado del control jurisdiccional’, Revista española de derecho constitutcional, Vol.
6, 1986, pp. 85-136, p. 109; M. Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional adjudication in Europe and the United
States: paradoxes and contrasts’, in G. Nolte (Ed.), European and US Constitutionalism, Cambridge
University Press, 2005, pp. 197-238, at pp. 217-218; P. Holländer, “El principio de proporcionali‐
dad: ¿variabilidad de su estructura?”, in J.-R. Sieckmann (Ed.) La teoría principialista de los dere‐
chos fundamentales – Estudios sobre la teoría de los derechos fundamentales de Robert Alexy, Madrid,
Marcial Pons, 2011, pp. 207-222; R.C.V. Ooyen, Politik und Verfassung – Beiträge zu einer politik‐
wissenschaftlichen Verfassungslehre, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006, p. 24;
U. Ramsauer, ‘Die Rolle der Grundrechte im System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte’, Archiv
des öffentlichen Rechts, 111, 1986, pp. 501-536, at p. 513.
22 C.S. Botelho, The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment, R. Albert, X. Contiades,
& A. Fotaidou (Eds.), reviewed in Católica Law Review, 2018, pp. 129-134, at p. 131.
23 On the contrary, defending that one key to constitutional stability is flexibility, see Z. Elkins, T.
Ginsburg, & J. Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, Cambridge University Press,
2009. To some, rigid constitutions might even provoke revolutionary processes. See A.V. Dicey,
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Liberty Classics, 1982, pp. 666-667.
24 Roznai, 2017b, p. 5





it should be protected against a possible irritation of “amendmentitis”.26 Like‐
wise, the constitution must impose some boundaries and limits regarding provi‐
sions considered worth preserving.27
If the constitution is swept away by the unpredictability, manipulation, and
the caprices of the given times, it will not be able to influence and to serve as a
barometer of the legal, political, and societal tissue.28 The ability of a constitution
to withstand external shocks is a form of “constitutional resilience”.29
Scholars point out several advantages to the rigid model that usually accom‐
panies written constitutions. First, rigidity keeps the constitution safe from dem‐
ocratic volatility of periodic majorities. Second, rigidity is a manifestation of the
foundational trait of a constitution.30
The measure of rigidity – higher or lower – can be found in several aspects
that shield the constitutional text from futile or impulsive changes. However, a
Constitution that aims to “limit the demos power” must be very demanding
regarding its amendability.31
II The Danger of Semantic Constitutions
The vexata quaestio of how to balance an old constitutional text with new histori‐
cal, societal, and political scenarios has occupied the mind of legal and philosophic
scholars for decades.32 One can remember how Karl Löwenstein, in his famous
book Verfassungslehre, tried to discover the ‘magic formula’ of a lasting constitu‐
tion. Löwenstein’s acknowledgement of how a constitutional text can lack norma‐
25 M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, Oxford, OUP, 2003, pp. 162-163.
26 K.M. Sullivan, ‘Constitutional Amendmentitis’, The American Prospect, Vol. 20, 1995.
27 Botelho, 2018, pp. 59-86; M.H. Kurik, ‘Die Theorie der Verfassungsentwicklung’, in R. Wahl
(Ed.), Verfassungsänderung, Verfassungswandel, Verfassungsinterpretation – Vorträge bei deustch-
japanischen Symposien in Tokyo 2004 und Freiburg 2005, Berlin, Duncker, & Humblot, 2010, pp.
13-28, at pp. 20-21.
28 J.R. Alamillo, ‘De la reforma constitucional y sus límites materiales. Consideraciones desde la
Teoría del Estado y de la Constitución’, Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, Vol. 30, 2012, pp. 89-138,
at p. 134, Nogueira de Brito, 2000, pp. 157, 161, and 164; P. Otero, Direito Constitucional Portu‐
guês, Coimbra, Almedina, 2010, p. 202; P. Badura, ‘Die Verfassung im Ganzen der Rechtsordnung
und die Verfassungskonkretisierung durch Gesetz’, in J. Isensee & P. Kirchhof (Ed.), Handbuch
des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Heidelberg, C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1992,
pp. 165-188; R. Medeiros, A Constituição Portuguesa num Contexto Global, Lisboa, Universidade
Católica Editora, 2015, p. 210; W. Berns, Taking the Constitution Seriously, New York, Simon &
Schuster, 1987, p. 236; Roznai, 2017b, p. 17.
29 X. Contiades & A. Fotiadou, ‘On Resilience of Constitutions. What Makes Constitutions Resist‐
ant to External Shocks?’, Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015,
pp. 3-26.
30 A.B. Ortega & I.S. Guijarro, ‘Constitutional Change in Spain’, in X. Contiades (Ed.), Engineering
Constitutional Change – A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and USA, Routledge, 2013,
pp. 299-323, at p. 299.
31 G.A. Ribeiro, ‘O paradoxo democrático na constituição portuguesa de 1976’, in M.L. Amaral &
S.P. Bettencourt, Estudos em Homenagem ao Presidente Rui Moura Ramos, Coimbra, Almedina,
2016, pp. 121-148, at p. 131.
32 Botelho, 2018, p. 129.
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tive content and have no strength to block the violation of fundamental rights
encouraged him to develop the theory of the normative force of the constitution.33
Instead of a normative constitution, in which the constitutional text accom‐
panies the constitutional reality (the famous “living constitution”), aspirational
constitutionalism is often based on semantic constitutions.34
Aspirational constitutionalism, characterized for having a prolix fundamental
rights catalogue and often accompanied by the restriction of governments’ free‐
dom of action or by an uncontrolled judicial activism, can become sort of a “cult
of constitutionalism”.35 In this scenery, in each political turn, all the attention
will “anxiously turn to the magic idea of the constitution, as if the solution to
every problem depended exclusively on it”.36
The “quasi-religious”37 idea of the constitution will often keep it as an object
of devotion and above external stimuli. Perhaps, most dramatically, the sacred
idea of the constitution could never pertain to the text itself, but to the people.
“Popular choice” is therefore the only sacred “source of the text’s legitimacy”.38
In a semantic constitution, the constituent power tries to portray the histori‐
cal and political moment of its elaboration, printing the memory and the resil‐
ience of a somehow mystical constituent moment eternally. This “impossible con‐
stitution”39 will in turn promote a distressing lack of connection between the con‐
stitutional text and the constitutional reality.40
33 K. Löwenstein, Verfassungslehre, Mohr Siebeck, 2000, pp. 151-154.
34 C.S. Botelho, ‘Aspirações constitucionais e força normativa da Constituição – Requiem pelo «con‐
ceito ocidental da Constituição»?’, in M.A. Vaz, C.S. Botelho, L.H. Terrinha, & P. Coutinho (Eds.),
Jornadas nos Quarenta Anos da Constituição da República Portuguesa – Impacto e Evolução, Porto,
Universidade Católica Editora, 2017, pp. 17-50; K.L. Scheppele, ‘Aspirational and Aversive Con‐
stitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence through Negative Models’,
International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2003, pp. 296-324, at p. 299; P. Häberle,
Das Menschenbild im Verfassungsstaat, Berlin, Duncker, & Humbolt, 2008, pp. 29-30. For an
interesting connection between aspirationalism and unamendability, see Roznai, 2017b, p. 32.
35 R. Albert, ‘The Cult of Constitutionalism’, Florida State University Law Review, Vol. 39, 2012, pp.
373-416.
36 R.E. Soares, ‘O conceito Ocidental de Constituição’, Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência, Vol.
119, No. 1986, pp. 36-73. Considering that the strength of constitutionalism may sometimes be
quite overstated, see J.Z. Benvindo, ‘«Revolutionary Reform» and the Seduction of Constitution‐
alism’, in R. Albert, X. Contiades, & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The Foundations and Traditions of Constitu‐
tional Amendment, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2017, pp. 157-173, at p. 168.
37 See P.W. Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 287;
S. Levinson, Constitutional Faith, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011; X. Contiades & A.
Fotiadou, ‘The Emergence of Comparative Constitutional Amendment as a New Discipline –
Towards a Paradigm Shift’, in R. Albert, X. Contiades, & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The Foundations and
Traditions of Constitutional Amendment, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2017, pp. 367-388, p. 377.
38 Albert, 2017, p. 677.
39 P.M. Pacheco, ‘La Constitución imposible: el gobierno de la economía en la experiencia constitu‐
cional española’, in J.R.E. Castillo (Ed.), Las sombras del sistema constitucional español, Trotta,
2003, pp. 293-320, p. 295. As L.H. Tribe & M. Dorf highlight, the constitution might be “mysteri‐
ous”, but it certainly is not “mystical” (On Reading the Constitution, Cambridge, Harvard Univer‐
sity Press, 1991, p. 18).
40 M.A. Vaz, Teoria da Constituição – O que é a Constituição, hoje?, 2nd ed., Porto, Universidade Catól‐
ica Editora, 2015, pp. 73-77.




As a metaphor, we can think of the constituent power taking a picture of a
concrete reality and trying very hard to perpetuate this reality through the times
to come. However, history shows that, in an intragenerational and intergenera‐
tional perspective, the political and sociological sensibilities of one time are not
necessarily bequeathed to the following decades.
When a constitution is not politically neutral and ideologically functionalizes
its fundamental rights, it risks being overcome by democratic volatility.41 In this
situation, we do not stand for a genuine constitution, rather a symbolic one or, in
Rainer Wahl’s words, a “pseudo-Constitution”.42
One of the common traits of semantic constitutions is the ritualistic
approach of the amendment process.43 Another trait of (forthcoming) semantic
constitutions is, as we will explain next, the ‘hyper-rigidity’ of the constitutional
text, which might develop pathological distortions (see constitutional narcissism,
infra D).44
III ‘Hyper-rigidity’: Unamendable or Eternal Clauses
1 What Are Unamendable Clauses?
Unamendable clauses (also called ‘entrenchment clauses’, ‘eternity clauses’, or
‘immutable clauses’) portrait a given constitutional identity and impose substan‐
tial limits to constitutional change. Thus, e.g., republican/monarchical forms of
government, federalist/unitary state, state’s unity, or protection of fundamental
rights and liberties.
As Richard Albert wrote, constitutional unamendability “tells us a lot about
that constitution and its essential values”.45 When framers of the constitution
portray the constitution as an accomplished and perfect set of norms, they forget
that each constitution has a life of its own, which flows from the interaction of
the society and the political players. There is no way to democratically block soci‐
etal change and prevent self-governing. The more a constitutional text invests its
energy in blocking change, the more severe that change will be.
Some scholars prefer to avoid the language of eternity – such as ‘eternity
clauses’ – when referring to unamendable clauses, since unamendability can never
restrict primary constituent power, which is, as Sieyès once described it, omnipre‐
41 C.S. Botelho, ‘Aspirational Constitutionalism, Social Rights Prolixity and Judicial Activism: Tril‐
ogy or Trinity?’, Comparative Constitutional Law and Administrative Law Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 4,
2017, pp. 62-87, at pp. 65-67.
42 Wahl, 2014, p. 31.
43 Contiades & Fotiadou, 2017, p. 378.
44 Using the expression “hyper-rigidity”, see C.B. de Morais, Curso de Direito Constitucional – Teoria
da Constituição em Tempo de Crise do Estado Social, Vol. II, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2014, p. 55.
45 R. Albert, ‘Introduction: The State of the Art in Constitutional Amendment’, in R. Albert, X. Con‐
tiades, & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment, Port‐
land, Hart Publishing, 2017, pp. 1-19, at p. 8. See also P. Suber, The Paradox of Self-Amendment: A
Study of Law, Logic, Omnipotence, and Change, Peter Lang International Academic Publishers,
Bern, 1990.
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sent.46 I will also avoid the use of the term ‘eternal’, although I do not entirely
agree with the assertion. Something that is designed as eternal might change in
the future, facing different circumstances. As a Brazilian poet, Vinicius de Mor‐
aes, once wrote: “may it [love] be endless while it lasts” (que seja infinito enquanto
dure).
The constitutional designers’ intent may be “to formalise a bargain or to pre‐
serve a founding norm, to transform the state or to reconcile previously warring
groups, or quite simply to express a constitutional value”.47 Whatever the reason,
it is important to emphasize that the first limit that derives from substantial limi‐
tation clauses is the prohibition of total amendments.48 That reduces constitu‐
tional amendment to a partial process.
Constraining the power of constitutional amendment, although necessary to
preserve stability, should never be done lightly, as it raises pertinent normative
questions.49 One can wonder which vital subjects are able to stand firm against
removal or alteration, even by super-majorities. Borrowing John Locke’s expres‐
sion, what are the “constitutional essentials” of each constitutional order?50 Some
of the eternity clauses are indeed vital traits in a democratic state (e.g., the sepa‐
ration of the State and the Church), others connect with a specific political choice
(federation/confederation or unitary state) or re-join with the old idea of a natu‐
ral law above the national and international legal positivation (human dignity and
natural rights).
The main intent of unamendable clauses might be an honest one: to attempt
the preservation of political, juridical, and democratic conquests after decades of
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. They portray the constitutional fathers’
faith and distrust in political actors.51 As I emphasize bellow, the Portuguese and
Spanish constitutional history fits well in this picture of democratic transition.
Unsurprisingly, though, the argument that unamendable clauses aim to preserve
the good democratic traits can be reversed. By contrast, it can be designed to pre‐
serve social injustice, power asymmetry, and anti-democratic choices.52
For this reason, unamendable clauses, when perceived in an absolute way,
hinder the stability that they were built to preserve. In an interesting metaphor,
46 F. Araújo, ‘Limites à revisão constitucional – um paradoxo?’, Polis – Revista de Estudos Políticos,
Vol. 7-8, 1999, pp. 95-99, and Roznai, 2017b, p. 16.
47 Albert, 2017, pp. 7-8.
48 P.B. di Ruffia, ‘Sui limiti della revisione costituzionale’, in Annali del Seminario giuridico dell’Univer‐
sità di Catania, Napoli, Jovene, 1948, pp. 122-172, at p. 149.
49 O. Doyle, ‘Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers’, in R. Albert, X. Contiades, & A.
Fotiadou (Eds.), The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment, Portland, Hart Pub‐
lishing, 2017, pp. 73-95, at p. 95.
50 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 227-231.
51 D.J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, ‘Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Con‐
stitutional Amendment Process’, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 62, 1993, pp. 111-162, at p. 123; Roz‐
nai, 2017b, p. 17.
52 A.S. Pedra, ‘Un análisis sobre la intangibilidad de las cláusulas pétreas’, Derechos y Libertades, No.
22, 2010, pp. 241-260, at p. 251; Roznai, 2017a, p. 28.




Denis Baranger argues that “constitutional substance is like quicksilver: it slips
from one’s grasp. Constitutional form is like crystal: it is easily broken”.53
But can we state that unamendable clauses force social breach and constitu‐
tional replacement? In other words, do they promote constitutional revolutions?
The answer is still unclear, as some scholars remind us that a new constitutional
order can emerge in a non-violent way, just like the example of some Latin Ameri‐
can constitutions.54
2 Are Unamendable Clauses Intangible?
“(B)y fixing the palette of non-negotiable colors in its self-portrait”, unamendable
clauses are armours against constitutional law’s contingency.55 With contingency
in mind, Luís Heleno Terrinha suggests that unamendable clauses’ added value is
not what they portrait, but what they do not: their “latent possibilities”.56 Accord‐
ingly, Xenophon Contiades refers to “the charm of the forbidden”, which can
become appealingly desirable.57
Literature has been debating unamendable clauses’ significance and whether
it is possible to alter or remove procedural and substantive amendment rules. We
can identify three main lines of thought regarding unamendable clauses: (i) essen‐
tiality and immutability, (ii) mutability, and (iii) mitigation of their immutable
trait.
The first thesis perpetuates ad aeternum the constitutional foundational
moment and grounds itself on the distinction between original constituent power
and derived constituent power.58 Its well-known argument is that the authority
to amend a constitution is inferior to that of the constituent power.59 In this
sense, the legitimacy of the constituent power justifies the imposition of con‐
53 D. Baranger, ‘The Language of Eternity: Judicial Review of the Amending Power in France (or the
Absence Thereof)’, Israel Law Review, No. 44, 2011, pp. 389-428, at p. 290.
54 Such as the Colombian Constitution of 1991 or the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999. See H.N.
Alcalá, ‘Consideraciones sobre poder constituyente y reforma de la Constitución en la teoría y la
práctica constitucional’, Revista Ius et Praxis, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2008, pp. 229-262, at p. 249.
55 Albert, 2010, p. 700.
56 L.H. Terrinha, ‘Os limites materiais da revisão constitucional: reflexividade, reflexão e contingên‐
cia do sistema jurídico-constitucional: Uma leitura teorético-sistémica do art. 288.º da Constitui‐
ção da República Portuguesa’, in M.A. Vaz, C.S. Botelho, L.H. Terrinha, & P. Coutinho (Eds.), Jor‐
nadas nos Quarenta Anos da Constituição da República Portuguesa – Impacto e Evolução, Porto, Uni‐
versidade Católica Editora, 2017, pp. 213-242, at p. 230.
57 X. Contiades, ‘Constitutional Change Engineering’, in X. Contiades (Ed.), Engineering Constitu‐
tional Change – A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and USA, London, Routledge, 2013,
pp. 1-5, at p. 4.
58 In Portugal, see J.J.G. Canotilho, ‘O problema da dupla revisão na Constituição Portuguesa’, Sepa‐
rata da Revista Fronteira, Coimbra, 1978, pp. 32-34, J.J.G. Canotilho & V. Moreira, Constituição da
República Portuguesa Anotada, II, Coimbra Editora, 2010, pp. 1010-1019; Marcelo Rebelo de
Sousa, ‘Partidos Políticos na Constituição’, Estudos sobre a Constituição, II, Lisboa, Pertrony, 1978,
p. 71. Against the classification as ‘original’ or ‘derived’ power, very common in the South Euro‐
pean literature, arguing that no constituent power is ever truly original, as it does not ever act ab
ovo or “in a tabula rasa or as a pure vacuum”, see Roznai, 2017b, p. 121.
59 C.E. González, ‘Popular Sovereign versus Government Institution Generated Constitutional
Norms: When Does a Constitutional Amendment not Amend the Constitution?’, Washington Uni‐
versity Law Quarterly, Vol. 80, 2002, pp. 127-242, at p. 131.
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straints to the constituted order. Since the remote constituent ‘people’ “has left
the house”, the only admissible way to breach these unamendable clauses is
through a revolutionary process.60
The second thesis applies the temporal rule of lex posterior derrogat lex ante‐
rior and favours the concepts of democratic constitutionalism and parliamentary
sovereignty.61 The impossibility to update the constitutional texts recalls the
“dead hand problem” and questions the roots of democratic legitimacy.62 Its
premise is that the power to amend the constitution is not inferior to the power
of creating one. There is no difference between the inaccessible “people at time-1-
the founding generation” and the tangible “people at time-2”, who want to update
the constitution in order to genuinely self-govern themselves.63 The real nub of
the critique is that having a ‘gone with the wind’ unlimited constituent power is a
contradictio in terminis.
Intermediate theses try to balance eternity with some degree of changeability
and empower derived constituent power as a genuine sovereign power.64 In order
to achieve this goal, some scholars interpret unamendable clauses as having an
aggravated degree of rigidity. They are self-imposed limitations to the derived
constituent power that can be altered by it. These clauses cannot be changed as
long as they remain positivated in the constitutional text. Therefore, they can be
altered, or even removed, just like any other constitutional norm. The only situa‐
tion in which unamendable clauses could not be amended is if the entrenchment
clauses’ list contemplated constitutional revision.65
A debate has started over the most recognized intermediate thesis, the ‘dou‐
ble revision theory’ (in Portuguese, tese da dupla revisão). This innovative thesis
60 T. Pereira, ‘Constituting the Amendment Power’, in R. Albert, X. Contiades, & A. Fotiadou (Ed.),
The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment, Portland, Hart Publishing, 2017, pp.
105-120, at p. 117. For a very interesting analysis on this topic, see Z. Oklopcic, ‘Constitutional
Theory and Cognitive Estrangement – Beyond Revolutions, Amendments and Constitutional
Moments’, in the same book, pp. 51-71.
61 J. Colón-Riós, Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy and the Question of Constituent
Power, London, Routledge, 2012, and Albert, 2010, pp. 663-715. In Portugal, see M. Caetano,
Constituições Portuguesas, Verbo, 1994, p. 157.
62 J. Goldsworthy, ‘The Case for Originalism’, in G. Huscroft & B.W. Miller, The Challenge of Origi‐
nalism – Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011,
pp. 42-69, at p. 57; Dixon & Landau, 2010, p. 10.
63 L.M. Seidman, On Constitutional Disobedience, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 13; M.
Tushnet, ‘Comment on Doyle’s Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers’, in R. Albert,
X. Contiades, & A. Fotiadou (Eds.), The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment,
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2017, pp. 97-104, at p. 101; Albert, 2010, pp. 677 and 698-699. High‐
lighting that the most relevant virtue of a self-governing people is precisely the capacity to
amend a constitution; see S. Barber, Constitutional Failure, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas,
2014, p. 111.
64 J.E.M. Machado, ‘The Portuguese Constitution of 1976’, in X. Contiades (Ed.), Engineering Consti‐
tutional Change – A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and USA, Routledge, 2013, pp.
273-298, at p. 286; J.B. Gouveia, Manual de Direito Constitucional, Coimbra, Almedina, 2005, p.
643; J. Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitucional, II, Coimbra Editora, 2002, p. 221; M.A. Reyes,
Constitución y Democracia, Madrid, Tecnos, 1990, p. 36.
65 M.G.F. Filho, ‘Significação e alcance das cláusulas pétreas’, Revista de Direito Administrativo, No.
202, 1995, p. 15.




suggests that the procedure to eliminate unamendable clauses should be comple‐
ted in two phases.66 In the first phase, the inherent substantial limitation is
removed from the entrenchment clause. In a second phase (therefore, a second
formal amendment), there can be changes in other constitutional provisions rela‐
ted to the limitation that was removed.
Not persuaded with this reasoning, Yaniv Roznai reminds us that the amend‐
ment power belongs to “a grey area between the ordinary legislative power (consti‐
tuted power) and the extraordinary constituent power”.67 In accordance, unamend‐
able clauses can never block the primary constituent power.68 Roznai’s expressive
statement is that “even rocks cannot withstand the volcanic outburst of the pri‐
mary constituent power”.69 With this assertion, the author concludes that the
double amendment procedure should be rejected “on theoretical and practical
grounds”.70
The main argument is that unamendable provisions “should be given a pur‐
posive interpretation according to which they are implicitly self-entrenched”;71
otherwise, it is a type of fraude à la Constitution (Verfassungsbeseitigung). Such con‐
cern exhales the fear of totalitarian Weimar Republic’s comebacks.72
I do understand some of the arguments against the double amendment
theory and why it has been called a “sly scheme”73 or a “sleazy escape route”.74 We
may criticize the double revision theory for being an ungainly and unsophistica‐
ted intellectual thesis; however, there are some arguments worth considering.
Primo, it is an attempt to mitigate the rigidness of unamendable clauses and
allow constitutional change without forcing the adoption of a new constitution.
The revolutionary process of creating a new constitution may be seductive, but it
has significant costs to the legality and the stability of the societal and institu‐
tional tissues.75
66 See generally, R. Albert, ‘Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules’, International Journal of
Constitutional Law, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2015, pp. 655-685, at pp. 661-666. In favour, see A.A. Santos,
‘Los limites materiales a la revisión constitucional a la luz de la doctrina y del sentido común’,
Revista de Estudios Políticos, Vol. 60-61, 1988, pp. 953-960, at p. 957; J. Miranda, Teoria do Estado
e da Constituição, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2002, pp. 604-607; S. Bonfigliuo, ‘Sulla rigidità delle
costituzioni. Il dibattito italiano e la prospettiva comparata’, Diritto Pubblico, Vol. 1, 2015, pp.
105-126, at p. 113. Against the theory of double revision, see L. Favoreu et al., Droit Constitution‐
nel, 5th ed., Paris, Dalloz, 2002, pp. 107-109. In Portugal, V. Moreira, Constituição e Revisão Con‐
stitucional, Lisboa, Caminho, 1980, pp. 106-108, argues that the double revision theory is “theo‐
retically inconsistent, logically unsustainable and legally indefensible”.
67 Roznai, 2017a, p. 38.
68 Yaniv Roznai stresses this idea several times in his outstanding book Unconstitutional Constitu‐
tional Amendments 2017b, pp. 16, 111, 123 (just to name a few).
69 Ibid, p. 129.
70 Ibid, p. 141.
71 Ibid, p. 140.
72 Canotilho, 1978, p. 29.
73 A.R. Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography, Random House, 2006, p. 293.
74 W.F. Murphy, Constitutional Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a Just Political Order, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2007, p. 504.
75 Tushnet, 2017, p. 99.
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Secondo, if we argue that the double amendment procedure lacks substantial
grounds and is a camouflaged de facto amendment, then the argument can
become circular. In order to save the legal purity of the amendment process, we
will force a constitutional revolution, which will also happen outside the de jure
context and perhaps with higher costs to institutional and social stability.
I should clarify, though, that I do not imply that the de facto (practical) per‐
spective should dethrone the normative one. Nevertheless, the double amend‐
ment thesis has the merit of giving some rest, although imperfectly, to the sub‐
stantial concerns of the amendment process.
IV Portugal
1 “Constitutional Dismemberment” in the Portuguese Transition to Democracy
In 1974 and after almost five decades of an authoritarian right-wing regime, a
bloodless military coup (Revolução dos Cravos) marked the beginning of the Portu‐
guese revolutionary transition towards democracy.76
The Portuguese Constitution received many foreign influences.77 Concerning
fundamental rights protection, the strong influence of the German Grundgesetz
(1949) and the Italian Constitution (1947) is evident. As far as the extended
social rights catalogue and economic constitution are concerned, one can trace
this trait to the constitutional experience of the ex-Soviet Union. If the system of
government (semi-presidential) was inspired on the French constitutional experi‐
ence, the ‘Provedor de Justiça’ (Ombudsman) has a clear inspiration in the Nordic
constitutional systems.
The Portuguese constitutional review model is hybrid, as it shares character‐
istics of the Kelsenian model and also traits of the American diffused model of
judicial review. It is a clear vertical model of judicial justice, with a constitutional
court on the top of the constitutional hierarchy. In comparison with the Italian,
German, and Spanish systems of judicial review, the Portuguese system has some
original features.78 While the aforementioned states opted for a concentrated
constitutional justice and to provide incidental control mechanisms in the form
of preliminary review, Portugal confers judicial review powers to ordinary courts
as well (Art. 204). Hence, an ordinary judge who finds a norm to be unconstitu‐
tional can dismiss that norm’s application in a concrete judicial process.
76 C.S. Botelho, ‘Portugal: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in R. Albert, D. Landau, P. Faraguna, &
S. Drugda (Eds.), 2017 Global Review of Constitutional Law, I.CONnect and the Clough Center for
the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College, 2018, pp. 230-234.
77 C.S. Botelho, ‘Is There a Middle Ground between Constitutional Patriotism and Constitutional
Cosmopolitanism? The Portuguese Constitutional Court and the Use of Foreign (Case) law’, in
G.F. Ferrari (Ed.), Use of Foreign and Comparative Law by Constitutional/Supreme Courts, Brill,
2019, forthcoming.
78 J. Miranda, ‘As instituições políticas portuguesas’, in J.T. Tejada (Ed.), La Constitución Portuguesa
de 1976 – Un estúdio académico treinta años después, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Consti‐
tucionales, 2006, pp. 35-72, at p. 41; J.M. Alexandrino, ‘Il sistema portoghese dei diritti e delle
libertà fondamentali: zone franche nella tutela giurisdizionale’, Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed
Europeo, 2003, pp. 272-284; M.L. Amaral, ‘Problemas da Judicial Review em Portugal’, Themis, VI,
2005, pp. 67-90, at p. 82.




So far, the Portuguese Constitution has undergone seven amendments. Its
first version, approved in 1976, had a heavy ideological weight of Marxist-Lenin‐
ist content.79 To this day, our Constitution’s Preamble is a perfect example of
what Liav Orgad calls a “ceremonial-symbolic Preamble”.80 It states that “the Con‐
stituent Assembly affirms the Portuguese people’s decision to (…) ensure the pri‐
macy of a democratic state based on the rule of law and open up a path towards a
socialist society”. To me, though, as the Portuguese Preamble lacks political neu‐
trality, it should not be legally enforceable and is just a nonbinding historical and
symbolic statement.
The constitutional text version of 1976 had norms such as “Portugal is a sov‐
ereign Republic … committed to transformation into a classless society” (Art.1);
“the Portuguese Republic is a Democratic State … with the goal of assuring the
transition to socialism through the creation of conditions for the exercise of
power by the working classes” (Art. 2); “the law can regulate that the expropria‐
tion of landowners, owners, and entrepreneurs or shareholders does not give rise
to any compensation” (Art. 82); “all nationalizations … are irreversible conquests
of the working classes” (Art. 83).
As the political and social tissue in Portugal began distancing itself from the
Marxist-Leninist approach, such a politically compromised drafting could have
led to a dangerous mismatch between the constitutional text and constitutional
reality, which would culminate in the loss of normative force by the Portuguese
Constitution.81 Auspiciously, the brave steps towards ideological and political
neutralization of the constitutional amendments of 1982 and 1989 reshaped the
Portuguese Constitution and made it consonant with the substantive require‐
ments of a truly democratic Rule of Law.82 I utterly agree with Gonçalo Almeida
Ribeiro, when he satires that “it is a romantic misconception to assume the per‐
fect democratic genesis of the Portuguese constitutional system.”83
The first constitutional amendment (1982) started the demilitarization pro‐
cess and established the Portuguese Constitutional Court (PCC).84 This court
replaced the “Council of revolution”, a military organ with powers of constitu‐
tional review.85 In 1982, for the first time in the Portuguese constitutional his‐
79 See Botelho, 2015, pp. 256-258, J.C. da Costa, ‘Tribunal Constitucional e debate público’, in R.G.
da Fonseca, C. Gomes, M.L. Rodrigues, P. Magalhães, & N. Garoupa (Eds.), 40 Anos de Políticas de
Justiça em Portugal, Coimbra, Almedina, 2016, pp. 113-141, at p. 120; J. Miranda, Da Revolução à
Constituição – Memórias da Assembleia Constituinte, Lisboa, Princípia, 2015, pp. 181-272.
80 L. Orgad, ‘The preamble in constitutional interpretation’, International Journal of Constitutional
Law, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2010, pp. 714-738, at pp. 722-723.
81 H.E. Hörster, ‘O imposto complementar e o Estado de Direito’, Revista de Direito e Estudos Sociais,
III, 1977, pp. 37-136, at p. 93, Miranda, 2006, p. 107; Jörg Polakiewicz, ‘Soziale Grundrechte and
Staatszielbestimmungen in der Verfassungsordnung Italiens, Portugals und Spaniens’, Zeitschrift
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1994, pp. 340-391, at p. 349.
82 L.P.P. Coutinho, A Autoridade Moral da Constituição – Da Fundamentação da Validade do Direito
Constitucional, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2009, pp. 429-450; Amaral, 2005, p. 88.
83 Ribeiro, 2016, p. 138.
84 Constitutional Law No. 1/82, from 30 September.
85 The Council of the Revolution had an advisory body – the Constitutional Commission – which
was extinguished, in 1982, when the Constitutional Court was created.
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tory, an autonomous constitutional jurisdiction was created. Another relevant
suppression was Article 10 (constitutionalization of the revolutionary process), a
quite singular norm in a comparative constitutional law perspective.
In addition, the 1989 amendment continued the demarxization process,
removed politically biased expressions such as ‘classless society’, and allowed new
forms of economic organization beyond socialism.86
If the constitutional nucleus did change, can we say that the Portuguese Con‐
stitution is still the same? I disagree with the vast majority of the Portuguese lit‐
erature on this matter. To me, the Portuguese constitutional identity did change
and for the better. In my point of view, the constitutional amendments of 1982
of 1989 are a perfect example of what Richard Albert brilliantly describes as “con‐
stitutional dismemberment”, which is a “deliberate effort to transform the iden‐
tity, the fundamental values or the architecture of the constitution without break‐
ing legal continuity”.87
2 Constitutional Amendment Rules
The Portuguese Constitution is rigid and includes several amendment rules (Arts.
284 to 289). It encloses formal (temporal, procedural, and circumstantial) and
material limits.
The temporal limits establish a time period between revisions. According to
Article 284, there should be a five-year gap between two ordinary amendments.
The aim is to promote stability and a deep reflexion prior to any constitutional
amendment. Regardless, the constitution also contemplates the possibility of sus‐
pending such constitutional hibernation on the grounds of an urgent and crucial
change (extraordinary amendment) that cannot be postponed. This fast-track pro‐
cedure abolishes temporal limitation but requires the increased legitimacy of a
majority of at least four-fifths of all the parliament members.
Regarding the procedural limitations, the initiative to amend the constitution
pertains only to the parliament. There can be no constitutional amendment by a
referendum (Art. 115 para. 4a rejects it). In addition, the president of the Repub‐
lic cannot refuse (through political veto) to enact a constitutional amendment,
nor request its preventive control.88
For ordinary amendments, the initiative of just one parliament member is
enough, although, for logistic purposes, once a draft revision of the constitution
has been submitted, “any others have to be submitted within a time limit of thirty
days” (Art. 285 para. 2). For the extraordinary amendment, an increased legiti‐
macy of a majority of at least four-fifths of all the deputies is required (Art. 286
para. 2). This is the most severe majority demanded in the Portuguese Constitu‐
tion.
86 Machado, 2013, p. 275.
87 R. Albert, ‘Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment’, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2018, Yale Journal of
International Law, pp. 1-84.
88 Respectively, Art. 286, paras. 3 and 278 of the Portuguese Constitution. See de Morais, 2014, pp.
295-298. With a different perspective, Machado, 2013, pp. 284-285 acknowledges “an implied
constitutional power to the President to request the preventive judicial review of a constitutional
amendment by the Constitutional Court and to veto it on the ground of its unconstitutionality”.




The approval of ordinary and extraordinary amendments requires superma‐
jorities. For the ordinary amendment, Article 286 paragraph 1 requires a majority
of two-thirds of the parliament members. Therefore, it is not possible to amend
the Portuguese Constitution without the agreement of the two larger parties: the
centre-right PSD (Social Democrat Party) and the centre-left PS (Socialist Party).
The circumstantial limitations (Art. 289) impede an amendment from hap‐
pening during a state of siege or emergency, in which fundamental rights can be
suspended (Art. 19).
3 The Portuguese Notorious List of Substantial Limitations
The tension between democracy and constitutionalism should be analysed care‐
fully, given each state’s concrete political and societal history.89 Therefore, I agree
with Oran Doyle when he suggests that these competing values ask for a resolu‐
tion that is “heavily context-dependent”.90
The Portuguese unamendable clause is so remarkable that it raises the perti‐
nent question of its compatibility with a plural and democratic state.91 In Portu‐
gal, constitutional unamendability means that these subjects cannot even be
democratically debated through a proposal of amendment.92
Article 288 (former Art. 290) of the Portuguese Constitution establishes sev‐
eral substantial limitations to the amendment power.93 This provision was
approved by a significant majority, since only five parliament members of the
conservative CDS-PP (Popular Party) voted against it.
The substantial limits to amendments are the following:
a) National independence and unity of the state; b) The republican form of
government; c) Separation between church and state; d) Citizens’ rights, free‐
doms and guarantees; e) The rights of workers, works councils, and trade
unions; f) The coexistence between the public, private, and cooperative, and
social sectors of ownership of the means of production; g) The existence of
economic plans, within the framework of a mixed economy; h) The appoint‐
ment of the elected officeholders of the entities that exercise sovereignty, of
the organs of the autonomous regions and of local government organs by uni‐
versal, direct, secret and periodic suffrage, and the proportional representa‐
tion system; i) Plural expression and political organisation, including political
parties, and the right of democratic opposition; j) The separation and interde‐
pendence of the entities that exercise sovereignty; l) The subjection of legal
norms to review of their positive constitutionality and of their unconstitu‐
89 I.W. Sarlet, A Eficácia dos Direitos Fundamentais – Uma Teoria Geral dos Direitos Fundamentais na
Perspetiva Constitucional, 12th Ed., Porto Alegre, Livraria do Advogado, 2015, p. 436.
90 Doyle, 2017, p. 95.
91 See F.L. Pires, Teoria da Constituição de 1976 – A Transição Dualista, Coimbra, 1988, p. 161;
Medeiros, 2015, p. 213. P. Suber, at Araújo, 1999, classified this norm as “a distressing naivety”
of the Portuguese constituent power.
92 Alerting to this not-so-irrelevant distinction, see Roznai, 2017b, pp. 22-23.
93 In the Portuguese constitutional history, only the republican constitution of 1911 established an
entrenchment clause, which was the “republican form of government”.
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tionality by omission; m) The independence of the courts; n) The autonomy
of local authorities; o) The political and administrative autonomy of the
Azores’ and Madeira’s archipelagos.
The current version of the Portuguese Constitution contains 14 clauses of
entrenchment, since some were removed or altered in the constitutional amend‐
ment of 1989. Therefore, it is quite clear that the unchangeable clause was indeed
changed. After 1989, several amendment proposals of Article 288 were presented,
but none of them was approved.94
The double revision thesis was, at least to some extent, incorporated in sev‐
eral constitutional amendment projects presented by the main political parties.95
Clearly, this de facto contingency calmed down passionate debates regarding the
scope of unamendable clauses.96
The Portuguese Constitution does not seem to allow a simultaneous double
revision, which is the synchronized amendment of the entrenchment clause and
of the principles and articles related to that limit.97 However, the sheer fact is
that the 1989 amendment did operate a simultaneous amendment, eliminating
former paragraph j) from the substantial limits list and also some obsolete and
politically biased norms that allowed only one form of economic organization.98
At the same time, Article 81 of the Constitution was modified regarding ‘national‐
izations’ and ‘rural estate property’, while other significant changes were intro‐
duced in the economic Constitution, concerning the ‘structure of the means of
production’.
The amendment of Article 288 is not surprising, since it was consistent with
major constitutional amendments in several other provisions. As Yaniv Roznai
very astutely points out, “one cannot expect unamendability to be any more oper‐
ative than the constitution’s other provisions.”99
The collapse of communism and the political changes of the 1990s asked for a
renewed understanding of what a constitution should be: not a government’s pro‐
gramme, not a semantic constitution, but an open constitution. As the constitu‐
94 In the constitutional amendments of 1992, 1997, and 2005, several amendment proposals were
presented, from both right- and moderate-left-wing parties. See F.P. Gonçalves, ‘La problemática
de la revisión constitucional’, in J.T. Tejada (Ed.), La Constitución portuguesa de 1976 – Un estudio
académico treinta años después, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2006, pp.
263-289, at p. 289.
95 Santos, 1998, p. 955.
96 de Morais, 2014, p. 276; Gonçalves, 2006, p. 287.
97 Santos, 1998, p. 959.
98 Paragraph j) stated “the participation of grass-roots popular committees in the local govern‐
ment”. Former version of paragraph f) entrenched “the principle of collective appropriation of
the means of production, of the soil, of natural resources” and “the prohibition of monopolies
and large rural estates” (currently paragraph f) and has a softer tone: “the coexistence of the pub‐
lic, private and cooperative and social sectors of ownership of the means of production”. Former
paragraph g) entrenched the “principle of democratic central planning of the economy” (now:
“economic plans” “within the framework of a mixed economy”). See Machado, 2013, p. 286.
99 Roznai, 2017b, p. 132.




tional praxis did not take these limits into consideration, they became obsolete
norms.100
As I have tried to explain previously, the first version of the Portuguese Con‐
stitution was not politically neutral. Carlos Blanco de Morais notes that the politi‐
cal costs of the “irreversibility of nationalizations” was over five billion Euros. This
lesson should definitely be food for thought.101
The debate on whether it is possible to alter or remove procedural and sub‐
stantive amendment rules still divides the Portuguese literature. Regarding
amendments to procedural revision rules, there is no major disagreement; it can
be done in consonance with the fundamental principles of the Portuguese Consti‐
tution.
The question that follows, thus, is: although de facto some eternity clauses
were changed or removed, is it possible to de jure remove or alter them?
Many arguments are in favour of this solution. If rights, liberties, and guaran‐
tees, which are protected in Article 288, can be restricted by the parliament (or by
the government with permission from the parliament) through Article 18 para‐
graph 2, a fortiori, the super-majority that constitutes the amendment power can
revise them as well.102 The proportionality imposition towards this restriction
must come into consideration. For example, it could be admissible to amend the
institutional structure of the judiciary as long as it did not compromise judicial
independence or the separation of powers. Or, it might be foreseeable to enter
into deeper stages of social integration in the European Union without breaching
our national independence core.103
Despite the discussion about the value of unamendable clauses (see above B
III 2), given the Portuguese’s astonishing list of substantial limitations, some
100 See R. Albert, ‘Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude’, American Journal of
Comparative Law, Vol. 62, No. 3, 2014, pp. 641-686. Another interesting perspective is the idea
of “constitutional atrophy”. See A. Vermeule, ‘The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers’, Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 421-444.
101 de Morais, 2014, p. 56, note 100.
102 Regarding rights, liberties, and guarantees restrictions, see C.S. Botelho, ‘Anotação ao artigo 165
da Constituição’, in J. Miranda & R. Medeiros (Eds.), Constituição Portuguesa Anotada, Vol. II, Lis‐
boa, Universidade Católica Editora, 2018, pp. 536-555.
103 Machado, 2013, p. 283. For a deeper understanding of constitutional pluralism through interna‐
tional and European Law lenses, see M.P. Maduro, ‘Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism’, in
M. Avbeli & J. Komárek (Eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, Port‐
land, Hart Publishing, 2012, pp. 67-84.
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scholars argue that not all of them have the same constitutional worth and divide
them in first- or second-degree limits.104
First-degree limits are so fundamental that even if they were not listed as
limits, they would still bound the constituent power. Their consecration on the
constitutional text has merely declarative purpose. Blurry considerations of natu‐
ral law or ‘universal legal conscience’ come to mind, although pure positivist theo‐
ries deny the existence of substantial limits to the constituent power. Limits to
constitution-making can also derive from international law compromises or ius
cogens norms. In turn, second-degree limits or amiss limits, which are not genuine
limits, as they do not portray the constitutional DNA. Therefore, their positiva‐
tion has constitutive effects.
Instead of dividing the Portuguese entrenchment clause in different levels of
unamendable worth and deciding which can or cannot be amended, perhaps we
should consider Rui Medeiros’ thesis about the relativization of the unamendable
clause.105 Medeiros stands for a “principological reading of the unamendability
clause”. Furthermore, understanding the provisions of Article 288 as principles
seems to be in consonance with the preparatory works of the constituent power.106
To give an example, in 1986, Portugal entered the European Community –
now European Union – and the continuous political and economic integration
could, to some, cause limitations to the sovereignty of the Portuguese state (para.
a) of Art. 288) and to the economic constitution itself.107 A ‘principiological read‐
ing’ that does not absolutize paragraph a) does allow for a dynamic understanding
of the state’s sovereignty.
Material limits can be implicit as well. Scholars have identified some implicit
limitations, such as: the protection of territorial integrity (inferred from the unity
of the State),108 the principle of irresponsibility of judges (derived from the prin‐
104 de Morais, 2014, pp. 286-287 considers as part of the Portuguese constitutional identity the fol‐
lowing subjects of Art. 288: national independence and unity of the state; republican form of
government; rights, liberties, and guarantees’ regime; universal suffrage; pluralism of political
organizations; separation and interdependence of the sovereign bodies; judicial independence;
and autonomy of the local power. In addition, C.B. de Morais brings together some implicit limita‐
tions, such as the constitutional rigidity (that prohibits a total revision) and the social state prin‐
ciple regarding some basic social rights which derive from the human dignity principle (health,
social security, and basic education). In an autopoetical perspective, see Terrinha, 2017, pp.
232-242. In turn, N. de Brito, 2000, pp. 397-440, has argued for immanent and absolute implicit
limitations to both constituent and amendment power (principles related to the nuclear identity
of the Portuguese Constitution).
105 Medeiros, 2015, pp. 207-219. Accordingly, A.P. Ayala, ‘La revisión de la Constitución económica:
del radicalismo socializante a la integración económica en la UE’, in J.T. Tejada (Ed.), La Constitu‐
ción portuguesa de 1976 – Un estudio académico treinta años después, Madrid, Centro de Estudios
Políticos y Constitucionales, 2006, pp. 87-143, p. 108. In Brazil, see Sarlet, 2015, pp. 436-437.
106 Testifying such historical argument, Miranda, 2006, p. 352.
107 Machado, 2013, pp. 276 and 289.
108 Doyle, 2017, p. 94; Y. Roznai & S. Suteu, ‘The Eternal Territory? The Crimean Crisis and
Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity as an Unamendable Constitutional Principle’, German Law Journal,
Vol. 16, 2015, pp. 542-580, at p. 573, believe that the alteration of a polity such as territoriality
should be done through existing constitutional processes.




ciple of judicial independence and impartiality), and the prohibition of lifelong
mandates (resulting from the democratic principle).109
V Spain
1 A Complex and Rigid Constitutional Amendment Procedure
After the fall of Franco’s dictatorship, which lasted between 1939 and 1975, the
democratic Constitution of 1978 was enacted. The Spanish Constitution stipu‐
lates two different procedures of constitutional amendment (Title X – Arts.166 to
169). The constitution prescribes two types of constitutional amendment: an
ordinary procedure, called “constitutional reform” (Art. 167), and a special or a
qualified procedure (Art. 168), designated “constitutional revision”.110
According to Russel Patrick Plato, there is also a “differentiate amendability”,
in which some constitutional provisions benefit from additional safeguards to
amendability.111 A constitutional revision through Article 168, even if it only
intends to surgically alter an expression or a word, can potentially alter the Span‐
ish constitutional DNA and therefore its core and identity.
The constitutional amendment initiative belongs to the government, to the
two Chambers (Congress and Senate), and, with restrictions, to the Assemblies of
the Autonomous Communities.112 Popular initiative is excluded.113
The ordinary procedure is the default amendment mechanism. If the object of
the amendment is not protected by Article 168, then it can be amended through
the ordinary procedure. The bills on constitutional amendments must be
approved by a majority of three-fifths of the members of each Chamber. If the
Congress and the Senate disagree, a joint commission will be created to agree on a
text that will be submitted to the Chambers to be approved by the same
majority.114 If the bill submitted to the Chambers does not reach the three-fifths
majority, the Congress may approve the amendment by a two-thirds vote, as long
as the text has obtained a favourable vote by an absolute majority of the Senate
(Art. 167, para. 2).115
The electorate can intervene by referendum, if one-tenth of the members of
either Chamber so requests.116 Therefore, the popular reinforcement through ref‐
erendum is only optional.
The extraordinary procedure, which can lead to a constitutional transition,
has a higher degree of rigidity and is quite complex. The ratio of this exceptional
procedure is to allow a total or partial amendment of the Spanish Constitution
109 Machado, 2013, p. 283.
110 Ortega & Guijarro, 2013, p. 302.
111 R.P. Plato, ‘Selective Entrenchment Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules’, New York
University Law Review, Vol. 82, 2007, pp. 1470-1509, at p. 1489.
112 Arts. 87 and 166 of the Spanish Constitution.
113 Á.G. Morales, Derecho Constitucional – Teoría de la Constitución y sistema de fuentes, Madrid, Cen‐
tro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2011, p. 185.
114 Art. 167, para. 1.
115 Ortega & Guijarro, 2013, p. 305.
116 Art. 167, para. 3.
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that affects the following articles: Articles 1 to 9 (principles and fundamental val‐
ues of the constitutional order), Articles 15 to 29 (fundamental rights), and 55 to
65 (the monarchy). Even if the alteration of these articles is just cosmetic or insig‐
nificant, it must follow the route of the extraordinary procedure.117
The decision to carry out this procedure requires a two-third majority of the
members of both Chambers. If we take a close look at the requirements of the
aggravated process, it almost demands the same majority as the constituent foun‐
dational moment.118 Once the amendment has been approved by the parliament,
it shall be submitted to the ratification of the electorate by referendum.119
Similar to the Portuguese Constitution, there is also a circumstantial limita‐
tion (Art. 169) that prohibits amendments from being initiated in time of war or
in the situations outlined in Article 116.
As the amendment provisions are part of the constitutional text, the Spanish
doctrine has considered that the constitutional court can control the constitu‐
tionality of the process.120 As Aharon Barak observes, the silence of many consti‐
tutional orders regarding a court’s authority to review constitutional amend‐
ments did not lead several constitutional courts into concluding they lacked
authority.121
2 Extraordinary Procedure of Quasi-unamendable Clause?
Since unamendable clauses were considered inefficient to block de facto actions
and hinder political systems replacement, they were never established in Spanish
constitutional history.122 Instead of opting for an unamendable clause, but never‐
theless wanting to preserve certain aspects of the democratic system, the Spanish
Constitution opted for a qualified rigidity.123 Some doctrine highlights the ‘super-
aggravated’ trait of the qualified procedure.124
Although there are no eternity clauses, the rigidity level in Spain is high and
the original constitutional design is to be well-preserved.125 If anything, the
highly demanding tone of the qualified procedure almost reminds us of an “invo‐
cation of the primary constituent power”.126 The effort to provide the Spanish
Constitution with powerful formal limitations was a way of “glorifying it”, pre‐
117 Ortega & Guijarro, 2013, p. 306.
118 A.L. Basaguren, ‘Encuesta sobre la reforma de la Constitución’, Teoría y Realidad Constitutional,
Vol. 29, 2012, pp. 11-88, p. 34.
119 Art. 168, para. 3.
120 Ortega & Guijarro, 2013, p. 309.
121 A. Barak, ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments’, Israel Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2011,
pp. 321-341.
122 Ortega & Guijarro, 2013, p. 303.
123 Ibid., p. 302.
124 F.B. Callejón, ‘Poder constituyente y límites a la revisión constitucional vistos desde la España’,
Nomos, Vol. 2, 2016, pp. 1-22, p. 10; Bonfigliuo, 2015, p. 109. Albert, 2010, p. 705, probably
would classify this entrenchment type as “heightened constitutional entrenchment”.
125 Pedra, 2010, p. 243; Antonio Enrique Perez Luño, Los derechos fundamentales, 9th ed., Madrid,
Tecnos, 2007, p. 69.
126 Roznai, 2017b, p. 38.




serving its core purposes and putting the dipole constituent/constituted power in
its place.127
In accordance, it is relevant to point out that the only two constitutional
amendments carried out so far in Spain followed the ordinary procedure of con‐
stitutional amendment. The Spanish Constitution, therefore, prescribes a “selec‐
tive rigidity” mechanism.128
As Víctor Ferreres Comella wrote, in Spain, the idea of constitutional amend‐
ment is somehow a “tabu”, since constitution-making was the aftermath of the
civil war and of the disenchantment in the normative force of the constitution.129
Collective memory and fear of revisiting an anti-democratic past played a huge
role in keeping the constitution protected from change. As a result, the mummifi‐
cation of the constitution has become a sort of ‘Nash equilibrium’ that lacks
incentive for change.130
If this constitutional attachment and exaltation was understandable during
the 1980s, in the 1990s some constitutional amendment proposals were consid‐
ered ‘disloyal’ to the democratic transition, ‘irresponsible’, or even a form of con‐
stitutional patriotism ‘desertion’.131
Some doctrine sharply warns that the Spanish Constitution is not only an
‘unchanged’ constitution but also an ‘unchangeable’ one.132 This constitutional
ethos had consequences on the quality of the Spanish democracy and on the dis‐
couragement of constitutional amendment initiatives. For precisely that reason,
several constitutional norms are labelled as ‘perpetual,’ ‘obsolete,’ ‘surmounted’,
or ‘virtual.’133
Although the Spanish Constitution does not have an unamendable clause,
Spanish literature identifies implicit limits to constitutional amendments, such as
the principle of the rule of law, fundamental rights, separation of powers, and
political decentralization.134 Some of these limits could be related to the superior
values of the legal order, namely “liberty, justice, equality, and political pluralism”
(Art. 1, para. 1).135
The Spanish and the Portuguese constitutional history have a lot in common:
constitutional distress in the 19th century, followed by republican experiences
and long dictatorships in the 20th century, transition to democracy in the 70s,
127 J.F.L. Aguilar, ‘De la Constitución «irreformable» a la reforma constitucional «exprés»’, Teoria y
Realidad Constituticional, 12, 2012, pp. 199-218, p. 200.
128 About “selective rigidity” in general, see R. Albert, ‘The Expressive Function of Constitutional
Amendment Rules’, McGill Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 2, 2013, pp. 225-282. With a more sceptic
vision of the “selective rigidity” argument and speaking in favour of a “uniform amendment pro‐
cess”, see Plato, 2007, pp. 1490-1493.
129 Comella, 2000 p. 32.
130 J.C.G. de Cara, ‘Encuesta sobre la reforma de la Constitución”, Teoría y Realidad Constitutional,
Vol. 29, 2012, pp. 11-88, p. 23.
131 Aguilar, 2012, p. 201.
132 Ibid., p. 205.
133 P.C. Vilallón, La curiosidad del jurista persa, y otros estudios sobre la Constitución, Madrid, Centro de
Estudios Constitucionales, 2006, pp. 63-77.
134 Ortega & Guijarro, 2013, p. 303.
135 Morales, 2011, p. 188.
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with decades of democratic consolidation so far.136 Still, the question remains:
Which idiosyncratic features of the Portuguese and Spanish constitutional orders
justified the different profiles of constitutional change?
Unlike the revolutionary Portuguese Constitution, the Spanish constituent
moment was not a destruens followed by a construens.137 There was a substantial/
material continuity that came from Franco’s regime and in which the Crown
played a significant role. The Spanish Constitution was the possible consensus
that all parties knew was unattainable in the long run. It embodied a political
commitment of peace with the harsh divisions of the tragic past, and all difficult
questions and interpretations were sent to the future.138 Therefore, there was a
“strategic interest” in altering it as less as possible.139
This is certainly a kind of functional constitutional approach, as the overall
result was an effort to keep the constitutional moment frozen – entrenchment of
current status quo, because if the question was reopened, the constitution would
have collapsed. As the lessons from the 1931 Constitution and the Civil War
taught, one of the most delicate issues is the regional structure of Spain. To a
large extent, the current crisis in Catalonia reflects that constitutional fragility.
For sure, a more flexible constitutional design could implode the Spanish Consti‐
tution, as it happened in 1936.140
After years of dictatorship in Spain, the Spanish Constitution was able to
affirm its normative force altogether, with a very demanding amendment pro‐
cess.141 Clearly, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 was very well integrated in the
European constitutional model and was considered an “elite construction”.142
With a different mindset, the Portuguese Constitution was one of the last
postmodern revolutionary constitutions.143 There was a substantial divorce from
the past and an ideological compromise. The Portuguese Constitution was the
product of two quite distinct political compromises: liberal and socialist. The dif‐
ficult compromise of divergent political elites and electorate can justify the Portu‐
guese constitutional prolixity and the absence – in its original version – of a polit‐
ically neutral approach.
The Portuguese Constitution is manifestly a defensive constitutional text,
with singularities that set it apart from the rest of the European constitutions.
This idea of defensiveness can be found in several constitutional traits: the long
unamendable clause (Art. 288); the prolix catalogue of social rights, one of the
136 Ayala, 2006, p. 93.
137 E. García, ‘Encuesta sobre la reforma de la Constitución’, Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, Vol. 29,
2012, pp. 11-88, at p. 30.
138 E.G. de Enterría, ‘La Constitución española como pacto social’, Impresiones sobre la Constitución de
1978, Madrid, Fundación ICO, 2004, pp. 231-232; P. González-Trevijano, ‘La reforma como
defensa de la propia Constitución’, Vol. 15, 2006, Cuadernos de pensamiento político, pp. 15-41, at
p. 17.
139 Comella, 2000, p. 32.
140 I thank Nuno Garoupa for this helpful suggestion.
141 Aguilar, 2012, p. 200.
142 B. Ackerman, ‘Three Paths to Constitutionalism – and the Crisis of the European Union’, British
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2015, pp. 705-714.
143 Ayala, 2006, pp. 87-89.




widest social rights catalogue in the world and probably the widest in Europe
(Arts. 58 to 79)144; the detailed economical constitution (Arts. 80 to 107); or even
the semi-presidential form of government (different from the Spanish rational‐
ized parliamentary system).
D Constitutional Narcissism and Insecure Helicopter Founding Fathers
To recall Richard Albert’s beautiful representation, constitutional amendment
rules “are the gatekeepers to the constitutional text”.145 The more fragile a
democracy is, the more easily the amendment process can succumb to a political
circus.146 Given its polymorphic trait, every constitutional order adapts its
amendment rules to better suit its own constitutional identity and extra-consti‐
tutional matrix of political, historical, economical, religious, and idiosyncratic fac‐
tors that make each Constitution truly unique.
Rosalind Dixon and David Landau show their concerns regarding unamenda‐
ble clauses, as they can encourage political elites to find ways to outline these lim‐
itations and provoke institutional stability, which “may be more difficult to con‐
strain, more destabilizing, or more damaging to judicial independence and the
rule of law”.147
Both the Portuguese substantial limitations clause and the Spanish high-
rigidity level may cause some tension on the natural flow of constitutional
dynamics. I called this dysfunctionality ‘constitutional narcissism’, which is a kind
of delusional imagery of constituent holiness. I have identified narcissistic traits
in the exceedingly strict amending formulas of both constitutions, which cer‐
tainly may be successful in preventing misuses of amendment power but, at the
same time, discourage legitimate renaissances of the constituent power.
In the similar way psychologists recognize a ‘helicopter parenting’ phenom‐
enon in our overprotecting parenting generation, I ascertain, in this narcissist
behaviour, a coping mechanism that I call ‘helicopter founding fathers’. Constitu‐
ent power, in a messianic and paternalistic move, wants to hover over the present
144 A. Ben-Bassat & M. Dahan, ‘Social Rights in the Constitution and in Practice’, Journal of Compa‐
rative Economics, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2008, pp. 103-119; J.M. Soria, ‘Das Recht auf Sicherung des Exis‐
tenzminimums’, Juristenzeitung, Vol. 13, 2005, pp. 647-655; M.B. Vieira & F.C. da Silva, ‘Getting
Rights Right: Explaining social rights constitutionalization in revolutionary Portugal’, Interna‐
tional Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2013, pp. 898-922, at pp. 898-899. Notice
that, in Spain, social rights do not have the same ‘fundamental rights’ status, being somehow
fundamental rights in fieri, depending on legislative implementation. See Botelho, 2015, pp.
203-207.
145 Albert, 2017, p. 1. Dixon, & Landau, 2010, p. 20 also mentioned the entrenchment clause as a
“democratic safety-valve”.
146 J.P. Royo, ‘La reforma de la Constitución’, Revista de Derecho Político, Vol. 22, 1986, pp. 7-60, at p.
60.
147 Dixon & Landau, 2010, p. 20.
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and future people like a helicopter. Such insecure “generational paternalism”148
constrains and discourages the present generation from making its decisions.149
Nevertheless, I must stress that I believe the narcissist pathology was dissimi‐
lar in the Portuguese and in the Spanish constitutional foundation. In Portugal,
the original version of the constitution was revolutionary, exhaled self-confi‐
dence, and was politically compromised as the best and only viable popular
choice: the transition to a socialist and classless society.
By contrast, in Spain, narcissism was more a result of constitutional anxiety,
fear of historical comebacks, and apprehension towards the future. Borrowing
Richard Albert’s thesis, the Portuguese foundational moment was a “transforma‐
tional entrenchment” and the Spanish one was a “preservative entrenchment”,
with some traits of “reconciliatory entrenchment” as well.150
The main difference between the Portuguese and the Spanish constitutional
arena is the way of dealing with de facto changes in the political and societal issue
that are not consistent with the constitutions’ boundaries. In the Portuguese sce‐
nario, nothing can be done, within the framework of the constitutional text, to
transition to a different constitutional approach, such as replacing one political
system by another.
On the contrary, the Spanish Constitution does not prescribe unamendable
clauses, therefore allowing constitutional transformation. Nevertheless, no con‐
stitutional amendment has yet been proposed through the qualified procedure of
Article 168. Hence, some scholars suggest that the article should be revised to
lessen the rigidity level.
Another interesting difference between the Portuguese and the Spanish con‐
stitutions is that while the Portuguese Constitution differentiates between ordi‐
nary and extraordinary amendments, taking into consideration temporal limita‐
tions (an extraordinary amendment is done outside the five-year timeline frame),
the Spanish Constitution distinguishes ordinary and qualified procedures
through the object of the amendment (whose provisions or principles are at
stake).
If the Portuguese Constitution does not require a referendum to complete
the amendment process, the Spanish Constitution demands it for total or partial
revisions under the qualified procedure of constitutional amendment (Art. 168).
In sum, unamendable clauses serve some purposes and are not intrinsically
pernicious in a constitutional theory’s perspective. Having a few provisions
immune to change does not immediately mean the dictatorship of the founding
generation over the following ones. This remark purports to prove too much: the
constitutional rigidness in tying the hands of present generations might prevent
148 C.S. Botelho, ‘A Tutela Constitucional das Gerações Futuras: Profilaxia Jurídica ou Saudades do
Futuro’, in G.A. Ribeiro & J.P. da Silva (Eds.) Justiça Entre Gerações, Lisboa, Universidade Católica
Editora, 2017, pp. 186-217, at p. 210.
149 Albert, 2010, p. 684, and Roznai, 2017b, p. 18.
150 Albert, 2010, pp. 666-667. Developing Richard Albert’s analysis, Roznai, 2017b, pp. 26-37 adds
the ideas of “aspirational” and “bricolage.”




radical or authoritarian political elites from “amputating the hands of future gen‐
erations”.151
There are some subjects that are vital to constitutionalism. We may try sev‐
eral normative and intellectual approaches to what this nuclear core is: natural
law, ius cogens international law, material constitution, constitutional DNA, lib‐
eral democracy, and so on. It is unarguable that the ‘people’ could decide to ignore
their own constitutional text and surrender themselves to a nondemocratic gov‐
ernment. However, in order to do that, the ‘people’ would have to break the con‐
stitutional core.
To me, the constitutional DNA from modern liberal constitutionalism shares
a few ‘constitutional essentials’, such as the democratic principle, popular sover‐
eignty, universal suffrage, political and personal rights and freedoms, and (in sev‐
eral constitutional traditions) social rights intrinsically connected to human dig‐
nity (minimum core of health, basic education, housing, and social security).152
These essentials are the alma mater of modern constitutionalism.
Not only do I believe a constitution can self-impose formal and (even some
reasonable) material limitations but I also sustain that these self-impositions can
never be immune to change.153 If the constitutional amendment process itself is
entrenched, this would imply some constitutional theory distress. Given the fact
that the constitution is the superior norm (norma normarum) of the internal legal
order, we would have a new hierarchy inside the hierarchy: founding legitimacy
above popular legitimacy.154
Should hierarchical intra-constitutional short-circuits be allowed? By hierarchi‐
cal intra-constitutional short-circuits, I mean the attempt to elevate constitu‐
tional reform rules above the ‘regular’ constitutional norm status of each consti‐
tutional norm.155 Therefore, if we automatically assume that amendment rules
cannot be reformed, we are elevating them above the constitutional status. A new
dipole would now arise in the constitutional text between original constitutional
norms and revised constitutional norms. Amendment rules would be the barome‐
ter above the constitution itself, a kind of super-rules, “superconstitutional
norms”,156 or “code of the constitutional code”.157
I do not deny that substantial limitations to both constituent and amend‐
ment powers bring out constitutional prominences. The problem that I foresee
regarding these super-constitutional provisions is that they are not able to cap‐
151 L. Ferrajoli, ‘Democracia constitucional y derechos fundamentales. La rigidez de la constitución y
sus garantías’, in L. Ferrajoli, J.J. Moreso, & M. Atienza (Eds.), La teoría del derecho en el para‐
digma constitucional, Madrid, Fundación Coloquio Jurídico Europeo, 2008, pp. 71-116, at p. 96.
152 In Portugal, the constitutional DNA can be found in the extra-systemic connection with the Uni‐
versal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 16, para. 2, of the Portuguese Constitution).
153 In this sense, Alf Ross, Theorie der Rechtsquellen: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des positiven Rechts auf
Grundlage dogmenhistorischer Untersuchungen, Leipzig, 1929, pp. 359-363.
154 See Albert, 2010, p. 708, for the expression “founding legitimacy” and the idea of “tiers of escalat‐
ing significance among constitutional provisions”.
155 Callejón, 2016, pp. 8-9.
156 Concerning “superconstitutional norms”, see Plato, 2007, p. 1473. In a similar approach, see
Albert, 2010, p. 683.
157 Terrinha, 2017, p. 223.
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ture the entire material constitution per se, leaving relevant ‘constitutional essen‐
tials’ behind. To confirm this assertion, I outline how, in states with unamendable
clauses, such as Portugal or Brazil, the discussion of adding implicit unamendable
clauses remains omnipresent.158
E Conclusions
I will conclude this article with the starting question: Given their obsolescence or
hindrance towards good governance, should entrenchment clauses be eliminated
de jure (through a channelled constitutional amendment process, such as the dou‐
ble amendment procedure) or de facto (through a revolutionary process material‐
ising outside the constitutional framework)?
To me, a “good constitutional design”159 should allow constitutional amend‐
ment power to surpass obsolete entrenchment clauses without breaking legal
continuity, even if this means a selective rigidity. For one thing, some scholars
alerted that in authoritarian transitions, there was the feasibility of constitu‐
tional order replacement as a substitute of amendment.160
It could also be quite ironic to replace a constitutional order for a new one
just to eliminate one unamendable clause. With this in mind, Mark Tushnet iden‐
tifies a “pro tanto constitutional replacement”.161 That being said, if one should
replace a republic for a monarchy, that would call for several amendments. But
imagine the case of eliminating the Portuguese constitutional control by omission
(entrenched in Art. 288), which is a procedure that has proven to be quite ineffi‐
cient.162 Or if the Portuguese preventive control (Arts. 278 and 289) were to be
removed (as the Spanish Constitution did), should that minor change trigger the
exercise of constituent power?
Moving away from petty constitutional problems, even if a state is facing a
severe and persistent (economic, financial, or political) crisis, there should be an
option to overcome it within the constraints of the legal order and its constitu‐
tional amendment rules.163 To some extent, I agree with the possibility of total
constitutional amendments that allow democratic constitutional transitions.164
If, metaphorically speaking, unamendable clauses were closed magical doors,
we could wonder how to open them. Like Ali Baba’s cave, which could only be
158 In Brazil, see Sarlet, 2015, pp. 427-451.
159 Tushnet, 2017 p. 99.
160 D. Landau & R. Dixon, ‘Constraining Constitutional Change’, Wake Forest Law Review, 50, 2015,
pp. 859-890, p. 867.
161 M. Tushnet, ‘Peasants with Pitchforks and Toilers with Twitter: Constitutional Revolution and
the Constituent Power’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 13, 2015, pp. 639-654.
162 Botelho, 2017, pp. 350-355, P. Otero, ‘Direitos económicos e sociais na Constituição de 1976: 35
anos de evolução constitucional’, Tribunal Constitucional – 35º Aniversário da Constituição de 1976,
I, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2006, pp. 37-55; J.B. Gouveia, ‘Inconstitucionalidade por omissão –
Consultas directas aos cidadãos eleitores a nível local – Anotação ao Acórdão nº 36/90 do Tribu‐
nal Constitucional’, O Direito, Vol. 122, No. II, 1990, pp. 420, p. 424.
163 Albert, 2010, p. 684.
164 Medeiros, 2015, p. 219.




open by a magical password, how might the closed door on constitutional alma
mater be unbolted?
There are good reasons to agree with Richard Albert’s assertion that citizens
should be “given the key to unlock their constitutional handcuffs” that possibly
will allow retreating from the foundational moment.165 Otherwise, constitution‐
alism would “breathe in all of the available oxygen” and would choke “democracy
into submission”.166 The “political self-understanding of the citizen”, highlighted
by Paul W. Kahn, is of paramount importance.167
The constitution is the most fascinating and intriguing norm, as it is a sym‐
phony of distinct ethos, aspirations, and political essentials. To preserve its nor‐
mative trait, the constitution can never dissolve itself neither in pure dynamics
nor in indifferent immutability.168 On the opposite pole, imagining a constitution
as a nonporous and hermetic building is inconsistent with what is expected from
a constitutional text as a fragmentary or unfinished project. As Vital Moreira
interestingly wrote, “unchangeable constitutions are only the imaginary ones, the
purely semantic”.169
Instead of unamendable clauses, which are “the strongest possible insulation
from amendment”,170 formal constitutional rigidity might answer the major con‐
cerns of constitutional permanence.171 Hence, if we blur the stern clear-cut dis‐
tinction between constituent and constituted power, we may discover that the
‘people’ from the constituted power should also have the intrinsic right to self-
governing and to “speak again within the constituted legal order”.172 As Xenophon
Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou very auspiciously wrote, “there is wisdom in the
acceptance of imperfection, including constitutional imperfection”.173
The ideal constitution can be compared to the mythological story of Pygma‐
lion’s love for the perfect woman. When Pygmalion finally met his ideal, flawless,
divine woman, he tragically realized she was not real, but only a cold statue that
he had been sculpting to please his desire for perfection. This story dreadfully
reflects the most basic human desire for perfection and the torment of not being
able to breathe perfectness into life.
165 Albert, 2010, p. 665.
166 Albert, 2010, p. 714. Accordingly, Medeiros, 2015, p. 213.
167 Kahn, 2005, p. 256. As P. Rangel, O Estado do Estado – Ensaios de Política Constitucional sobre Jus‐
tiça e Democracia, Alfragide, Dom Quixote, Alfragide, 2009, p. 16 auspiciously wrote, “the Consti‐
tution is rewritten everyday and the politics – at least until a certain extent – appears as constit‐
uent constitutional politics” (free translation).
168 K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 20th ed., C.F. Müller,
1999, pp. 20-33.
169 V. Moreira, ‘Revisão e revisões: a Constituição ainda é a mesma?’, in Anos da Constituição de 1976,
Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, 2000, p. 197.
170 Tushnet, 2017, p. 102.
171 A. Pace, Potere costituente, rigidità costituzionale, autovincoli legislativi, Padova, CEDAM, 1997, p.
129.
172 Pereira, 2017, p. 118.
173 Contiades & Fotiadou, 2017, p. 373.
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This article has endeavoured to show that the constitution is a “process of
becoming” and not a mere “segment of being”.174 One thing is stability; another is
inalterability. One thing is constitutional maturity and durability; another is
devaluation of the “invisible constitution”.175 That being said, a perfect polity can
perhaps never pertain to the imperfect boundaries of a constitutional text, but to
the mutability, aspirations, and dreams that make life worth living.
174 Loughlin, 2003, p. 113. In fact, and as Albert, 2017, p. 676 reminds us, “if a constitution seques‐
ters this fundamental right of self-definition from citizens, then a constitution cannot be what it
is intended to be – a continuing autobiography, a project of discernment and an evolving self-
portrait.”
175 L.H. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution, Oxford, OUP, 2008.
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